Being Toward Death
Being-Toward-Death: An Overview
Being-toward-death (Sein-zum-Tode) is not an orientation that brings Dasein closer to its end, in terms of clinical death, but is rather a way of being. Being-toward-death refers to a process of growing through the world where a certain foresight guides the Dasein towards gaining an authentic perspective. It is provided by dread of death. In the analysis of time, it is revealed as a threefold condition of Being. Time, the present, and the notion of the "eternal", are modes of temporality. Temporality is the way we see time. For Heidegger, it is very different from the mistaken view of time as being a linear series of past, present and future. Instead he sees it as being an ecstasy, an outside-of-itself, of futural projections (possibilities) and one's place in history as a part of one's generation. Possibilities, then, are integral to our understanding of time; our projects, or thrown projection in-the-world, are what absorb and direct us. Futurity, as a direction toward the future that always contains the past—the has-been—is a primary mode of Dasein's temporality.
Death is that possibility which is the absolute impossibility of Dasein. As such, it cannot be compared to any other kind of ending or "running out" of something. For example, one's death is not an empirical event. For Heidegger, death is Dasein's ownmost (it is what makes Dasein individual), it is non-relational (nobody can take one's death away from one, or die in one's place, and we can not understand our own death through the death of other Dasein), and it is not to be outstripped. The "not-yet" of life is always already a part of Dasein: "as soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die." The threefold condition of death is thus simultaneously one's "ownmost potentiality-for-being, non-relational, and not to be out-stripped". Death is determinate in its inevitability, but an authentic Being-toward-death understands the indeterminate nature of one's own inevitable death — one never knows when or how it is going to come. However, this indeterminacy does not put death in some distant, futural "not-yet"; authentic Being-toward-death understands one's individual death as always already a part of one.
With average, everyday (normal) discussion of death, all this is concealed. The "they-self" talks about it in a fugitive manner, passes it off as something that occurs at some time but is not yet "present-at-hand" as an actuality, and hides its character as one's ownmost possibility, presenting it as belonging to no one in particular. It becomes devalued — redefined as a neutral and mundane aspect of existence that merits no authentic consideration. "One dies" is interpreted as a fact, and comes to mean "nobody dies".
On the other hand, authenticity takes Dasein out of the "They," in part by revealing its place as a part of the They. Heidegger states that Authentic being-toward-death calls Dasein's individual self out of its "they-self", and frees it to re-evaluate life from the standpoint of finitude. In so doing, Dasein opens itself up for "angst," translated alternately as "dread" or as "anxiety." Angst, as opposed to fear, does not have any distinct object for its dread; it is rather anxious in the face of Being-in-the-world in general — that is, it is anxious in the face of Dasein's own self. Angst is a shocking individuation of Dasein, when it realizes that it is not at home in the world, or when it comes face to face with its own "uncanny" (German Unheimlich "not homelike"). In Dasein's individuation, it is open to hearing the "call of conscience" (German Gewissensruf), which comes from Dasein's own Self when it wants to be its Self. This Self is then open to truth, understood as unconcealment (Greek aletheia). In this moment of vision, Dasein understands what is hidden as well as hiddenness itself, indicating Heidegger's regular uniting of opposites; in this case, truth and untruth.
The Problem of Death
“Death” (Tod) is Heidegger’s name for a stark and desolate phenomenon in which Dasein (that is, our world-disclosive “being-here”) encounters its own end, the end most proper to the distinctive kind of entity that Dasein is. Being and Time’s phenomenology of death is primarily concerned to understand Dasein’s death ontologically. Heidegger is asking what the phenomenon of our own individual death reveals to us all about the nature of our common human being, that is our Dasein (and what that discloses, in turn, about the nature of being in general. Understood ontologically, “death” designates Dasein’s encounter with its own world-disclosure, the end of that particular way of becoming intelligible in time which uniquely “distinguishes” Dasein from all other kinds of entities.
The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon by Mark A. Wrathall
Heidegger has characterized the first division as "preparatory". The term 'preparatory' refers first of all to the general scope of the treatise (which sought to uncover the Being of Human Being as a means of access to the meaning of Being as such).
But specifically, the term refers here to an essential incompleteness in the first division.
The first division is incomplete with respect to:
(1) The mode of Dasein's Being
We have dealt mostly with Dasein in its inauthentic mode i.e., in its being in the world of its 'concern' and in its being with others. The 1st division has investigated these structures and the various ways in which Dasein can 'lose itself' in them.
It has not, however, fully investigated the way in which Dasein can 'win itself.' The first division has not given us an adequate grasp of Dasein's authenticity.
(2) The formal structure of interpretation
We are involved in an interpretation of Dasein. As such, the articulation in the text must exhibit that which underlies any interpretation viz. the structures of the understanding (i.e., the fore-structure).
The specific structure which the first division has not 'fulfilled' is the fore-having. Now, fore-having deals with totality or wholeness and it is this aspect of Dasein that has yet to be achieved.
The structure of existence has been seen to be essentially ahead-of-itself and as such Dasein, as long as it exists, is essentially 'incomplete.' The first division has not given us a grasp of Dasein as a whole.
(3) The primordiality of the interpretation
The care structure itself needs a more primordial grounding. The structural moments which underlie the unitary phenomenon of Being-in-the-world have been exhibited, but the need to exhibit their unity (i.e., the unity of the Care Structure) has yet to be achieved in an adequate manner.
Once we have grasped Dasein as a whole and once we have exhibited Dasein's authenticity, then we will be able to re-enter the existential structures of Care with the intent of uncovering the ground for their unity: such a ground will manifest itself as Time.
It is temporality that forms the ontological meaning of the Being of Dasein and it does so by exhibiting a manifold unity which 'runs through' the various structural 'moments' of existentiality, facticity and falling.
The unifying role of temporality can be anticipated by speaking of time as the unity of a future which "makes present" in the process of having been. Thus,
this is how the Being of Dasein is 'connected' to temporality, how 'Being and Time' are thought together.
Section 45 (Methodological)
We spoke of the need for the interpretation to conform to the fore-structures of the understanding. We must be specific about this: the fore-having deals with the notion of totality or whole, the fore-sight with the particular or specific task or entity that is before us within the totality and the fore-conception which is the conceptualization of that specific entity within the totality.
In the interpretation of Dasein we must have:
(i) Fore-having: Dasein as a whole
(ii) Fore-sight: Dasein itself
(iii) Fore-conception: Temporality
Now, Heidegger says (232/275), if we can get an adequate grasp of the fore-having and the fore-sight then we will gain simultaneously a 'sketch' of the fore-conception.
The question then becomes: 'What will the analysis need to accomplish with respect to the structures of the fore-having and the fore-sight?'
In the fore-having, we will need to grasp Dasein as a whole (II1)
In the fore-sight, we will need to grasp Dasein in its authentic mode (II2).
Only after this task has been carried out can we gain access to the fore-conception of time as the meaning of the Being of Dasein (II3).
And only as such can the analysis of Dasein claim completeness, only then will the Dasein Analytic be complete.
First task: the problem of grasping Dasein as a whole (II1).
Section 46 (mostly negative)
The problem of gaining access to Dasein as a whole lies in the very structure of Dasein's Existenz -- especially in the existential moment of the 'ahead-of-itself: the essence of this structure is possibility ('Dasein is permeated with possibility') and as such Dasein is 'out-standing' (stands outside of itself) as long as it is -- Dasein is essentially incomplete as long as it is living.
In consequence of this, it appears that Dasein cannot be grasped as a whole within its life -- yet upon its death, it does not reach a whole either but simply 'is' no longer (236/280).
The negative outcome of section 46 indicates that the problem of the 'wholeness' of Dasein is to be located in the problem of 'life and death' -- but the solution to this problem is still lacking.
Section 47
Heidegger takes up the direction of the problem by investigating the sense of dying. He says that one does not 'experience' death in the sense of 'undergoing the process' -- for in death one is simultaneously no longer in Da-sein. And while one may witness another's death -- the dying of others is not something we can experience in a genuine sense -- we, are at best, simply there alongside them.
So while death is 'objectively' there to be seen in the world, the phenomenon of death cannot be represented by others -- in the sense that their death can represent or take the place of my death.
Dasein has the character of mineness and the very possibility of 'representing' another's death is an impossibility -- we must begin to see death as a possibility that is mine.
And with this Heidegger moves towards the analysis of death as an existential phenomenon (rather than, say, a sociological or physiological phenomenon).
Section 48
Heidegger begins the existential interpretation of death by attempting to understand the sense of the 'incompleteness' of Dasein which section 46 spoke about viz., as long as Dasein lives it is outstanding and not-yet complete (whole).
What is the existential character of this 'not-yet' which belongs to Dasein and which seems to prevent Dasein from being-a-whole? Heidegger presents a sequence of notions of the 'not-yet, a sequence that is guided by the phenomenal contexts which present themselves.
The Not-Yet
(1) Debts
The example is one of the 'lack of togetherness' between a debt and its payment -- the debt is still 'outstanding' until the pieces of money get 'added on' and the debt is 'filled in.' At this point the transaction is 'complete.'
Heidegger sees in this example the character of ready-to-hand (between money and loans, etc.) and with this the inappropriate sense of not-yet with respect to Dasein (which does not have the character of readiness-to-hand).
Dasein's life is not a 'debt' which must be 'paid' at some particular time and with some particular 'sum.'
(2) The Moon
When the moon is not-yet perceptible as a whole we can nevertheless speak of it as being capable of being a whole and we can see it become one (i.e., a 'full' moon). The 'not-yet' here refers to a kind of perceptibility of something present-at-hand.
(3) A Ripened Fruit
There is a reference here to Aristotle's notion of potentiality: The essence of something always already contains the direction towards its 'end'.
The fruit becomes that which (as unripe) it was 'not-yet' -- and not through some external agent but of its own 'cause' i.e., the ripening (the 'not-yet') belongs to the very Being of the fruit. Here, Heidegger sees an analogy with Dasein's 'not-yet': for the 'not-yet' of Dasein's Being belongs to the very Being of Dasein. (Dasein's 'ripening' belongs to Dasein's Being.)
But here the analogy breaks -- for although in Aristotle the ripening of the fruit is a kind of 'fulfilling' -- the extreme 'not-yet' of Dasein i.e., its death, is not a fulfilling. Nevertheless, this example indicates that the 'not-yet', in some sense, belongs to Dasein. But what then is the meaning of this 'end' of Dasein?
The sense of Ending
Just as the 'not-yet' belongs to Dasein inasmuch as Dasein is its 'not-yet' (in the active sense of comportment), so too, Dasein's relation to its 'end' is not one of being 'at' an end, but rather Being-towards-an-end.
There is an existential relation between Dasein and its End which Heidegger will characterize as Being-towards-Death.
Section 50
We have now an indication of the direction that Heidegger is going to take with respect to the problem of Death and the wholeness of Dasein: the problem of Death has been bound up with the existential structure of Dasein's Being -- if this structure can be fully worked out, then it will provide the whole of Dasein insofar as the initial charge of 'incompleteness' with respect to death will have been overcome. For if Death is a peculiar possibility of Dasein's Being, then it is not something 'outside' of Dasein.
With this in mind, Heidegger gives us a formal, preliminary existential ontological sketch of Death (through Care). Death, in terms of the Being of Dasein, must be seen in terms of the structure of Care.
(1) In terms of existentiality (which has, as its primary feature, possibility)
Death must be seen as Dasein's uttermost 'not-yet.' Death 'stands before' (Bevorstand) -- but not in the sense of a storm (presence-at-hand), nor the re-modeling of a house (ready-to-hand) nor the arrival of a friend (with-others)...
Rather -- Death is something which 'stands before' each Dasein as its own.
Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Dasein 'stands before' itself as this possibility. Death is Dasein's ownmost (eigenste-eigen), non-relational (i.e., when Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, all its relations to other Dasein become loosened) and uttermost possibility.
And in such a possibility, the structure of the ahead-of-itself finds its most primordial concretization in Being-towards-Death.
(2) In terms of Facticity
Death is not a peculiar possibility that Dasein has 'chosen,' nor does it have the character of something Dasein can 'choose'...
Rather, Death is a possibility that Dasein has been thrown into.
And in anxiety in the face of death what one is anxious about is ones' ownmost, non-relational self.
(3) Yet, in terms of Fallenness
Everyday Dasein tends to conceal this uttermost possibility of Death.
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All three moments constitute the existential concept of Death (in a preliminary manner). Heidegger begins to concretize these moments.
The analysis begins with the manner in which Dasein proximately and for the most part relates to its death viz. in the mode of Fallenness.
Section 51
(Compare with Leo Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilych)
Everyday Being-in-the-world is a fleeing in the face of Death. Heidegger's descriptions here are quite clear.
Section 52
After the description of inauthentic fleeing in the face of death, Heidegger begins the movement towards an authentic conception of Death.
In this moment Death must be seen as it 'shows itself from itself' and not covered over as something which it is not.
Death reveals itself as
(1) Certain -- not in the sense of an empirical or logical certainty, but in an existential signification: it is a truth of existence that Dasein dies.
(2)Indefinite -- this certainty of Death is indefinite with respect to its 'when.' This certainty and indefiniteness of Death -- which is Dasein's ownmost, non-relational possibility -- is the existential ontological meaning of Death.
(A meaning which is concealed in Dasein's fallenness, but which is nevertheless disclosed from the phenomenon itself.)
Section 53
The task now is to see how one can gain an authentic grasp of this existential conception of Death. The nature of the possibility (of Death) must be appropriated.
We do not relate to death as an ontic possibility to be 'actualized' (and thus transformed), we do not, in Heidegger's words, expect it -- rather, we must see death as a possibility (the possibility of the impossibility of existence) and relate to it in terms of its character as possibility. (Heidegger calls this relation one of anticipation.)
We must grasp death in the structure of the possible.
Now, this opening up of the possible within one's life is the beginning of an authentic existence.
Reflection on what is means not-to-be mirrors back a reflection on what it means 'to-be' -- and this in terms of possibility [cf. 263/307 "Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's ownmost (eigensten) and uttermost potentiality for Being -- that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence (eigentlicher Existenz)."]
Death is disclosive inasmuch as it brings Dasein back towards its ownmost self.
The characteristics which belong to this disclosure:
(1) Death is Dasein's ownmost possibility.
(2) Death is non-relational. Death individualizes Dasein. Dasein must be forced to 'take over' its ownmost Being.
(3) Death is not to be outstripped (surpassed): it is Dasein's uttermost possibility and must be recognized as such. In doing so Dasein has 'freed' itself for its death and for its own possibilities.
(4) Death is certain.
(5) Death is indefinite.
